Strongman Politics

I’ve discussed extensively the policy choices facing Americans in the 2020 presidential election and why I think Joe Biden’s policies would result in an improved world. However, I believe the best critique of Donald Trump’s candidacy doesn’t just dryly compare policy, but also takes into account all the “extracurriculars” that come with him.

As a warning, this post will be more partisan than other things I’ve written. I’d like to catalog some of the outrageous things Trump has done or said because there is a nebulous concern with Trump’s presidency that pure policy discussions can’t convey. Again, I’ll be aiming towards a center-right audience because that’s who I need to convince, but I also can’t imagine I’ll be saying anything new; Trump is obnoxious, self-serving, and corrupt and this is well known. I admit, I’m not sure why that knowledge hasn’t convinced conservatives to dump Trump, but generally speaking I think it’s true that conservatives have stuck with the president. Thus, in my last post, I mostly ignored these more outrageous discussions in favor of more dry policy comparisons. Nonetheless, for my own sanity, I think it’s worth reiterating just a small fraction of what the president has done over the last four years. Maybe putting it all in one place will prove more convincing than hearing constant headlines for years.

Before I get to Trump, I should point out that the Left has its own nebulous darkness on the horizon. Nothing I say here should be construed to downplay that threat. Manifestations of these bad ideas on the Left include broad attacks on the culture of open discourse and free speech, advancement of racism and segregation, support for radical violence, and aggrandizement of proven failed policies of state control of the means of production.

The reason for my focus in this essay on Donald Trump despite these concerns about the Left is twofold. One is that Donald Trump is tied directly to the worst ideas on the Right. Joe Biden is not similarly bound to the above enumerated problems. Secondly, there is a strong pushback on the Left against these more radical ideas. For example, countervailing groups on the Left established the Neoliberal Project, wrote the Letter on Justice and Open Debate in Harper’s Magazine this year, and most directly, decisively elected Joe Biden over Bernie Sanders in the primary.

On the Right however, conservatism has collapsed in the face of Trumpism. The Republican Party decided to forego writing a party platform this year in favor of stating they will “enthusiastically support the President’s America First agenda”. Meanwhile the Republican National Committee, the national organization that is responsible for electing Republican candidates up and down the ballot, merged its fundraising and spending with Trump’s reelection campaign, an unprecedented move reflecting Trump’s complete domination of the political Right.

Polarization

One of the first things that comes to mind about President Trump is his unpresidential behavior. He constantly interrupted Joe Biden during the first presidential debate, and Chris Wallace entered into several verbal altercations with the president, loudly pointing out that he had agreed to these rules he was constantly breaking. He spends press conferences with foreign leaders complaining about his own petty grievances instead of actually discussing the visit. He lies constantly and retweets conspiracy theories. Does any of this matter?

I would argue that one result is continued pressure on political polarization. At the same debate, Trump was asked to condemn white supremacy and seemed unwilling to denounce anyone who might support him. Joe Biden, on the other hand easily dealt with the issue by broadly condemning violence in any form, something he has done continually since May. Just after the debate, Trump criticized Representative Ilhan Omar, not for policy disagreements, but mostly based on where she was born despite her being an American citizen: “She’s telling us how to run our country. How did you do where you came from? How’s your country doing?” Again, this pushes us further from actual policy discussions, discussions which we should be having.

In fact, last year, Donald Trump told several sitting congresswomen that they ought to “go back” to their countries and fix them before telling “us” how to run “our” country. I have been concerned with the overzealous accusations of racism coming from leftists, but despite their misuse of the accusation, prejudice is still wrong. Attacking people for qualities they do not control, like where they were born, rather than engaging with their ideas is immoral and weak. In fact, three of the representatives were born in the United States, and the last came to America when she was 12. But that doesn’t matter, these are American citizens, elected to represent other American citizens, and it’s disturbing that the president does not identify them as Americans because of what they look like.

This is polarizing and it is bad for our country. The policies and arguments put forward by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez or Ilhan Omar are often terrible, and those policies ought to opposed. But when the president attacks them for where they were born or what they look like, it appears that the choices are bad socialist ideas or bigotry, which alienates Americans and forces a false choice.

I won’t go into more details on other incidents, but it’s worth noting the president’s polarizing behavior here isn’t unique. He said people in the suburbs won’t have “low income housing” built in their neighborhoods. He said John McCain was only a war hero because he got captured and he likes “people who weren’t captured”. He made no attempt to deny the QAnon conspiracy theory when asked about it and instead said he appreciated that they like him, and Trump continued to advocate for hydrochloroquine as a COVID treatment months after the FDA had cancelled clinical trials because of its ineffectiveness.

Trump’s polarizing actions should disqualify him from the presidency. We need to focus on open discussion and debate, not increasing tribalism. Trump is incapable of moving the country in that direction.

Authoritarianism

Donald Trump has authoritarian tendencies. He has praised Kim Jong-un, he’s commended Xi Jinping installing himself as Chinese leader for life, and he’s even publicly sided with Vladimir Putin over American intelligence over whether there was Russian intelligence operations during the 2016 election. Focusing on specific actions, Trump cleared peaceful protesters outside the White House with pepper spray and police in riot gear in order to get an absurd photo op of him holding a Bible outside a church. Police attacked an Australian journalist live on TV. He also attempted to fire Bob Mueller as special counsel when he was being investigated, but White House counsel Don McGahn threatened to resign and he backed down. Recently, Trump has urged Attorney General Bill Barr to go after his political enemies with the Justice Department.

Trump also has a poor relationship with democratic elections. He has repeatedly sought to undermine his own election in 2016 (the election he won!) claiming, without evidence as usual, that millions of fraudulent votes were cast. Trump established a commission to look into this fraud, which seemingly dissolved without issuing a report or finding any evidence. Looking ahead, Trump has called for the 2020 election to be delayed, and when asked about the election, he has repeatedly refused to say he will accept the results. Note Biden had no problems answering Chris Wallace’s softball question, stating he would wait to declare victory until the election was certified and would concede if he lost. This isn’t particularly difficult or controversial, unless you are Donald Trump! Apparently the rule of law simply does not apply to him. Before and since the debate, Trump has continued to undermine the legitimacy of the election and voting by mail in ballots, even though many states have been voting by mail for years. Given the circumstances of the pandemic and logistical challenges of rapidly expanding mail in voting, Trump ought to be taking steps to make sure the election is legitimate and transparent, yet he has completely failed to do so.

Refusing to accept the principles of the rule of law, peaceful transfers of power, and election legitimacy ought to disqualify Trump from the ballots of voters. These are authoritarian strongman tactics, and they ought to be harshly condemned.

Corruption

It’s hard to distinguish Trump’s corruption from his authoritarian tendencies. Unlike staunchly ideological leaders who might wield state power and abridge the rights of their citizens in the name of communism or ethnic nationalism, Trump seems more comfortable with simply wielding state power for his own personal gain. Regardless of where its categorized, Trump’s administration is deeply corrupt.

Trump has reserved his pardon power almost exclusively for his political allies. Roger Stone was pardoned after lying to investigators to cover for Trump (although his sentence was excessive). Trump also pardoned former Sheriff Joe Arpaio, one of the most abusive law enforcement officers in the country, who was in prison after ignoring many court orders about his inhuman treatment of inmates. Arpaio had endorsed Trump in 2016. Trump has also rewarded his family members with high-ranking offices in the West Wing. On the other hand, Trump fired Alexander Vindman and Ambassador Gordon Sondland after he was acquitted from impeachment charges in February. Both testified against the president.

Speaking of impeachment, Trump was impeached for abusing his office. On a 2019 official diplomatic call, Donald Trump asked the president of Ukraine to look into a wild conspiracy theory about a company in Ukraine having a copy of Hillary Clinton’s email server. Trump also asked the president to look into Joe Biden, his political rival, for wrongdoing. At the same time, foreign aid appropriated by Congress had been held up, according to Donald Trump’s chief of staff Mick Mulvaney, specifically to put pressure on Ukraine to investigate this email server. Trump’s EU ambassador Gordon Sondlond also testified that a White House visit was offered to Ukraine in exchange for announcing an investigation into the Bidens, and apparently Mick Mulvaney, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and National Security Advisor John Bolton were all aware. The Trump administration however, blocked all three from testifying.

I know that this became a highly political issue and Trump’s senate trial declined to hear any witnesses along party lines, but I have yet to hear any reason to excuse the president’s behavior. Trump’s own hand picked staff all agree that the president used the office of the president to achieve these self-serving political goals which had nothing to do with the the good of the country.

This is wrong, and this is corrupt. The president cannot use the powerful mechanisms of the state for his own personal ends; we must be a nation of laws where authority is strictly bound to rules that apply to all. When the Senate declined to even hear witnesses to discuss the obvious crimes that Trump had committed, they said this ought to be left up to the electorate. The results of this election ought to reflect our opinion of whether the president is above the law.

Incompetence

Trump isn’t great at accomplishing the things he actually wants to accomplish. Trump has over and over again apparently appointed terrible people to work for him who he is then forced to fire. Trump fired Michael Flynn when indicted for lying to the FBI, H.R. McMaster by tweet, Anthony Scaramucci after 10 days, former RNC chair Reince Priebus and retired General John Kelly as chiefs of staff, Omoraosa Manigault from the Public Liaison Office, and Steve Bannon as chief strategist. Gary Cohn resigned because of Trump’s protectionist policies, and former Secretary of Defense James Mattis resigned in protest of Trump’s foreign policy. Tom Price was forced to resign as HHS Secretary after criticism of his use of private charters and military aircraft for travel, former Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielson was forced to resign when she didn’t stop accepting asylum seekers, Rex Tillerson was fired as Secretary of State after clashing with Trump’s policies for months, and Jeff Sessions was repeatedly abused by President Trump on Twitter for refusing to intervene in the special counsel investigation into Russian interference until Sessions resigned. Such absolute mayhem does not reflect well on the President’s ability to find the “best” people.

Consequently, despite having a Republican majority in both the House and the Senate, Trump was unable to deliver on major pieces of policy like fixing Obamacare or cutting the deficit. Also, we should have a brief reminder of the constant bizarre behavior by the president these past four years. He didn’t have a single policy he could promise when Sean Hannity asked what his second term goals would be. He has also tweeted a conspiracy theory about TV personality Joe Scarborough being involved in a murder in 2001, and most recently that Obama had had Seal Team Six murdered. These do not seem like the actions of a competent leader. Regardless of all this chaos, the economy did fairly well until the biggest story of incompetence happened: COVID-19. Trump campaigned on being a good manager and private sector CEO. I’ve expressed in the past that I didn’t think management skills mattered much in politics compared to policy, but every now and then there’s a crisis that needs managing. We got one this year and Trump has abjectly failed.

200,000 Americans are dead directly from the pandemic and the CDC estimates 250k in excess mortality since February. Trump lied to Americans about what he knew about the virus and played it down instead of sounding the alarm. Trump’s CDC and FDA had major failures that delayed testing. Then, in the summer once cases had finally started to drop, instead of trying to continue that trend, he held and has continued to hold crowded rallies. He mocked people for wearing masks, and most importantly, claimed we only had rising case numbers because of better testing. Later, in August, Trump retweeted a claim that COVID had only killed 9,000 Americans. In an Axios interview in July, Trump literally couldn’t understand the reporter talking to him about rising U.S. deaths, simply declaring that you couldn’t use that metric. Not to mention, the White House held an event in the Rose Garden to promote Amy Coney Barrett as their new Supreme Court nominee without good precautions, infecting several members of the Senate Judiciary Committee as well as the President himself. On Saturday, October 10, just two weeks later, a large rally was held on the White House lawn.

The level of incompetence here and the cost in human lives is simply unspeakable.

Future of Conservatism

Finally, returning to appeal more directly conservatives, the American Right is at a fork in the road. The Cold War anti-communist coalition of social conservatives, libertarians, business interests, and nationalists has completely fallen apart. This process has been long in the works, but the schism accelerated in the 2016 election, and now conservatives can choose to be on the side of individual liberty or authoritarianism.

Donald Trump has pulled the Republican Party towards authoritarian nationalism. He abhors the rule of law and the international liberal order, and he undermines the ideas of peaceful transitions of power or a separation of public and personal interest. The GOP party platform literally doesn’t exist. But these authoritarian ideas don’t stem from Trump alone; there are others working to maintain these ideas and platforms into the future, and it has resulted in some disturbing events. Right wing conspiracy theorist Laura Loomer was praised by Trump and even endorsed by Representative Matt Gaetz despite her association with InfoWars as well as her openly wishing violence upon immigrants.

On the intellectual side, Adrian Vermuele argues in The Atlantic that conservative legal theory ought not to focus on originalism, but instead read morality into the law along with respect for authority and the importance of social hierarchies since “…the central aim of the constitutional order is to promote good rule, not to ‘protect liberty’ as an end in itself.” This has long been a strain in conservative thought, but usually, at least in countries like the U.S. and U.K., conservative defense of institutions has often included individual rights and the market.

The Economist notes that what’s remarkable about Trump’s insurgent brand of “conservatism” is a complete trashing of institutions across the spectrum. The message has been to “beat” the Left at any cost, regardless of Trump’s flagrant disinterest of freedom or morality. I’m not here to say Adrian Vermuele is the future of conservatism, but rather that if the intellectual Right is abandoning individual liberty and limited government under Trump, there are people with actual bad ideas waiting to fill the vacuum. Rejecting Trump is a way to avoid going down that path.

And the stakes are high. The political Left, as I mentioned earlier, is undergoing some disturbing trends. Robert Tracinski writes in The Bulwark that if we take the threat of the Left seriously, this election may be the Anti-Flight 93 Election; it’s the last chance to kick out Trump and get the political Right’s house in order before the leftists come knocking. Now is the time to do this when the cost is relatively low with “sleepy” Joe Biden. We need the alternative to socialism to be a vibrant communicator who can articulate the importance of the rule of law and the free enterprise system; if we are stuck with a self-absorbed authoritarian strongman with no ideology or understanding of economics, the socialists will be ascendant. And moreover, a loss for Biden would be a signal to the radical Left that appeals to the middle are dead; a convincing Biden victory is a way for more moderate parts of the Democratic party to muscle out the Bernie bros.

Finally, I’m not alone in this thought. Conservative columnist George Will, former National Review writer David French, and former editor at National Review Jonah Goldberg are all prominent right wing thinkers who oppose Trump despite being staunchly opposed to the Left. I doubt they’ll vote for Biden, but they definitely won’t be voting for the president. The only path forward for a strong American Right is to reject Donald Trump.

Photo: White House, public domain image.

Biden and Trump on Policy

Earlier this year I put together a list of most important policies that the U.S. federal government could implement which are actually discussed by candidates. The list takes into account impact both broad and deep. Also as part of my election year discussions, I’ve covered issues with our current electoral system and then, given those problems, whether it makes sense to spend time researching and voting in elections where you’re only one of many thousands or millions of voters. I conclude that in close elections where there are large differences between the major party candidates, it often makes sense to vote for one of the two candidates.

This post will take a look at this year’s presidential candidates based on their policies. I’m putting aside non-policy issues, like competence, corruption, and impact on democratic norms as I intend to cover them in my next blog post. I also think a policy-specific approach is useful to cut through tribal identities and focus on actual impacts in the real world. Extending the discussion from my last essay, I will be comparing Trump and Biden to see if there are large expected differences in their policy. As stated in that post, swing state voters should probably vote for one of these candidates since their expected value of voting would be high.

This post will be aimed slightly right of center since my policy analysis shows Trump doing very poorly compared to Biden. Based on purely policy grounds, I think swing state voters should vote for Biden, even if they are conservative. I will be taking inspiration from my previous post about important policies. If you want more background on why I think these policies are most important, I suggest skimming it first.

Great Power Relations

This is a newer issue that I wanted to focus on after reading The Precipice and its discussion of existential risk. I recommend that post, but in summary: an existential event is uniquely terrible because not only are there no humans left on earth, but any future human civilization ceases to exist. We are doing very little today to assess these risks or to plan and coordinate how we might deal with existential risks. Toby Ord estimates a 1 in 6 chance of human extinction this century. Even if that’s high, Metaculus suggests a 2% risk which is still completely intolerable when discussing the future of humanity.

Presidential politics isn’t really discussing existential risk directly, but the presidency has an outsized impact on great power relations, particularly between the U.S., China, and Russia, and catastrophic relations between them could significantly heighten existential risk. Indeed Toby Ord specifically discusses great power relations as a major risk factor in his book, and Trump’s own Defense Department notes the heightened nuclear landscape we find ourselves in their 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (Brookings Institute discussion). China and the U.S. have essentially incompatible views of liberalism, freedom, and human rights, and the world is better off with an America that promotes those ideas and thwarts China’s authoritarian ideology without resulting in dangerous tensions.

Ultimately, Joe Biden represents a pretty standard American foreign policy when it comes to dealing with China and Russia: working within the broad liberal world order to promote democracy, markets, and human rights. For example, he has committed to extending the New START treaty with Russia that limits the numbers of nuclear warheads each country can have. Donald Trump, on the other hand, is erratic, dismissive of allies, pointedly materialistic, unconcerned with human rights, and has no long term strategy. This has not yielded a particularly less threatening or less risky world.

On calls with foreign leaders, Trump seems unprepared and more focused on his own accomplishments rather than on specific policy objectives. As China continues to rise in global importance, Trump has spent a lot of his time alienating liberal allies, and waging a trade war with the EU. This has resulted in European leaders, like Emmanuel Macron, noting that America is no longer a reliable ally against rising authoritarian regimes. Pew Research surveyed citizens of 13 developed countries and found lower confidence in Donald Trump to do the right thing than Xi Jinping or Vladimir Putin. Regardless of truth, perception that the U.S. cannot be relied on will lead to a more dangerous world and worse geopolitical outcomes as allies are forced to make do without us.

Conventional wisdom might suggest Trump was especially tough on China, but in reality he emphasized the exact wrong points at the expense of actual geopolitical power. He started a trade war, harming the U.S., which ultimately resulted in extracting Chinese promises to purchase additional American exports. While undertaking these trade negotiations, Trump refrained from criticizing China’s curtailing of the rights of seven and a half million residents of Hong Kong, and allegedly even encouraged Xi Jinping to construct Uyghur re-education camps. Chinese negotiators have stated they prefer Trump’s reelection because his goals are so transparently materialistic, and those goals are in areas where the CCP can compromise, unlike other American administrations’ focus on human rights. Trump also abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a Pacific based broad trade agreement meant to specifically improve trading relations between the U.S. and major Chinese trading partners, isolating China. Biden is also not great on trade, but has emphasized that he will push China on human rights, not soybean purchases.

I’ve also mentioned in the past that a huge advantage the U.S. has over China is our ability to take in new immigrants and turn them into Americans, and this is doubly true for skilled Chinese immigrants who often attend American universities. Yet the Trump administration has attacked legal immigration (even more so during the pandemic), making it harder for America to exercise an important asset in any long term disagreements with China.

Comparatively, Joe Biden is simply not that extreme. He’s been a fairly middle-of-the-road Democrat since the Bronze Age. Of course, that does means he’s voted for the Iraq War and was part of the Obama administrations’ intervention in Libya, but Donald Trump also supported the Iraq War, although he only wanted to go into Libya “if we take the oil” (?). Donald Trump has notably strengthened relationships with Israel, but Israel has little sway over China and Russia. Meanwhile, traditional important allies have been shunned.

Donald Trump is dangerous. A cold war with China is not inevitable, and a military arms race with modern technology, AI, and advanced genetics added on top of nuclear weapons is a recipe for absolute disaster. Even a small percentage increase in this risk through mismanagement could be worth millions of lives. The U.S. needs to work with our allies to confront China where necessary and work with the Chinese government to improve transparency and understanding between our two nations, while promoting human rights. Being President of the United States should perfectly position someone to make the case for freedom, free markets, and democracy against an authoritarian regime, but Trump has failed to do so, and his bad policy here should disqualify conservatives from backing him.

COVID-19 and Catastrophic Risk

This is an expansion of risk assessment from the Great Power Relations section and from the discussion in May. Catastrophic risk management is underfunded and underprioritized. We should be preparing for the next pandemic, the next earthquake, and so on. Neither candidate has really called for comprehensive congressional action on establishing better risk management, so let’s focus on COVID-19, which remains a key issue.

Donald Trump emphasized his private sector CEO skills as a key asset contrasting himself with the political establishment, and his approach to governing has radically differed from prior presidents. Therefore, when a crisis arose that required management and leadership skills, I think it’s fair to expect Donald Trump to outperform the average. His administration did not:

The U.S. has worse per capita deaths than a wide cross section of developed countries including Italy, France, and the broad EU. Germany, Canada, and Japan have rates several times lower. The U.S. rate is similar to the U.K. but is on a much higher trajectory, similar to Mexico. At best, we’re average, at worst, we are the most advanced country to still have out of control cases.

Trump revamped his National Security Council, including removing several people who were part of pandemic preparedness, altering the pandemic response policy set up under Obama. John Bolton claimed this was a cost-saving measure and allowed for better implementation of policy. Whatever the case, there’s no one to blame except Trump; he reorganized his bureaucracy in the way he wanted, and this was the policy result we got. He is also ultimately in charge of the FDA and CDC and as we discussed in April, those agencies had colossal failures. Moreover, Trump publicly discussed how COVID was not a problem, saying in February the number of cases “within a couple of days is going to be down to close to zero.” Meanwhile, he was telling reporter Carl Bernstein that this virus was extremely serious and deadly in February, and that he had purposefully played it down to avoid a panic. Regardless of morality, this is simply bad policy and cost American lives.

Trump should absolutely get credit for shutting down travel from China earlier than many people wanted. However, instead of acknowledging that any policy could only delay and not prevent a full outbreak, Trump then spent all of February downplaying the virus like it wasn’t a threat. Instead, given his apparent understanding of the challenge, he should have been issuing government guarantees to purchase masks, creating guidelines for how to reduce spread, encouraging indoor sporting events and concerts to consider cancelling, and more. We know much more about this virus now than we did in March. Delaying the peak from April to June or July could have saved literally thousands of lives.

Even after all this, as cases climbed in the south in the summer, Trump maintained that things were not getting worse, and seemed to make fun of people wearing masks. He even held an indoor rally in the middle of the summer.

As of September 28, the CDC estimates 208,000 – 274,000 excess deaths in the U.S. since February 1, with Metaculus estimating between 220,000 and 360,000 U.S. deaths from COVID this year. This is an unmitigated catastrophe. Not every death can be attributed to Trump’s policies, but we have plenty of evidence that his policies could be considerably better. Other developed countries have death rates a fraction of ours, and Trump has constantly made poor decisions, downplayed the virus compared to the flu, encouraged supporters not to wear masks. At this point, even small policy shifts that reduced the death toll by 10% would have saved 20,000 lives. Conservatives must hold the president accountable for failing to protect American lives.

Congressional vs Executive Power

The functionality of the U.S. government as a system for creating and executing policy affects every other policy. In particular is the glaring problems of congressional mismanagement and executive overreach. Unfortunately, both Trump and Biden have poor records, although Trump may be worse.

Conservatives ought to be concerned about the power of the executive and the reduced role Congress has played in policy-making. Moving away from a consensus building model in Congress to a winner-take-all super executive elected every four years to do anything they want is a bad idea for many reasons. For one this increases the stakes at every election and thus increased polarization. It also means more power concentrated more centrally, which conservatives should be quite skeptical of, and at least many were under Obama. And finally, there are specific things that conservatives want the government to do, like maintain a strong national defense. If we continue to pile responsibilities on the President without involving Congress or actual legislation, then our national defense relies solely on the whims of one person, who you might not trust.

I’ve criticized the Obama administration significantly on executive overreach, and Joe Biden was part of that administration. Obama invented the concept of unauthorized drone wars, complete with secret kill lists, including American citizens. Yet, Gene Healy details how Trump has essentially expanded on Obama’s work in every way, including civilian casualties, all under the guise of the 2001 Authorization of Use of Military Force against the perpetrators of 9/11, even nine years after Osama Bin Laden’s death. He also bombed Syria under a separate claim of pure executive war powers which has no constitutional basis, and this year unilaterally targeted a member of the Iranian government (and a bad person) without any congressional authority. This is an unprecedented use of presidential authority to wage war, and blatant disregard of the constitution. In an absolutely insane reversal, Trump vetoed the war powers resolution passed by congress to reign in his authority. No constitutional conservative can defend this action.

Healy does note that many of the more aggressive uses of Trump’s executive power can’t be categorized as “new” power grabs; Congress had largely ceded those powers to the president even if no other president had actually used them. For example, the Supreme Court upheld a later iteration of Trump’s travel ban (although earlier ones were ruled unconstitutional), and although “there’s ample ground for disputing the Court’s decision”, Congress allowed the president to interpret national security powers quite broadly.

However, on trade, Trump clearly expanded executive authority by lying about Canadian steel imports being a national security threat. This broad interpretation of the law was again unprecedented and means that tariff levels are likely solely controllable by the president, which is an absurd constitutional farce; Congress should have the sole ability to pass tax law. Trump also declared a national emergency in order to fund his border wall after Congress repeatedly refused to allocate money (partially struck down in court). Trump needed to lead on these issues, make broad appeals to the political center, and put pressure on Congress — which Republicans controlled for two years! Instead, he failed and fell back on executive orders which fly in the face of conservative small government beliefs.

For his part, Biden has not offered to fund a border wall through executive authority, so I guess point to him. On the other hand, Biden indicated he thought FEMA should be leveraged (and presumably a national emergency declared) to fund K-12 schools due to coronavirus challenges. Again, to be consistent, school funding from the federal government really ought to come from Congress, not executive authority.

Alright, now let’s touch on impeachment. If you want my full thoughts, read this post here. In summary, regardless of legality, Trump held up Congressionally authorized funds for political purposes, trying to get dirt on his enemies. From the perspective of concerns about executive power, this is wrong, and conservatives should be terrified of progressives getting into office and doing exactly what Trump did. We need to deescalate using the state as a political weapon; Trump is not deescalating.

When asked about them, Biden has repudiated some of the powers that Trump has seized, and has criticized Trump for taking them. I’m pretty skeptical here. Obama was loose with his executive authority, and Biden was in the room when that happened. Presidential power seems to just stack, so I’d be surprised if Biden really pulled back on authority after what Trump has done.

Of course, no one is talking about what I actually wrote about in May, which was a resurgent Congress, not just a presidency that maybe didn’t quite expand executive authority as much as before. So I think overall the most important long term affects on congressional and executive power are worse with Trump, but they’re not night and day. Something like Trump gets an F and Biden gets a D.

Liberalizing Immigration

Conservatives and I may be far apart on this issue, but I think there is some common ground. The United States has perhaps the longest and most well known history of immigration of any nation on earth, and we all agree some immigration will continue to occur. Given that immigration will continue, we can also agree that an improved system is needed; current immigration rules favor family migration instead of merit and skill. We should change our immigration system to focus more on skilled immigrants, or on retaining students who pay to be educated at the best institutions and then seek to work in the most technologically advanced and dynamic large economy in the world.

Improving our immigration system to be more merit based would be a huge boon to our free market system, to our national security, to our global influence, and of course, would result in more Americans. We want the smartest people in the world to move here and innovate on the cutting edge. If we shut our doors, those people will go to other countries, and we will lose a massive advantage we have over places like China, which, as self declared ethno-states, simply cannot attract diverse talent from across the world.

Yet Donald Trump has slashed legal immigration and made it significantly harder for skilled immigrants to enter the country, or even apply for green cards. Both green card and temporary visa applications decreased 17% each between 2016 and 2019 while rules for granting green cards were narrowed. He even banned any new H-1B visas, which focus on high skilled, high earning immigrants (who are great for innovation) for the rest of this year through executive order. Given pandemic related issues are likely to continue into next year, I wouldn’t be surprised if this continued past December.

Given these extraordinary actions, particularly during the pandemic, I would estimate a Trump second term could see a million fewer legal immigrants than a Biden term. This would have long term negative effects on the U.S. economy, not to mention on those immigrants who literally want to be Americans. Trump has also shown no ability to work with Congress on reforming the immigration system, instead working through executive unilateral action.

Biden has planned to reverse most of Trump’s immigration policies. I’ve emphasized the horrific impact on high skilled immigration, but Biden focuses on more liberal talking points, particularly about children of illegal immigrants and refugees. Trump has absolutely crushed the number of refugees the U.S. has taken, thwarting a long standing Cold War era policy. While conservatives may be skeptical of the benefits of refugees (recent data shows they contribute positively to the economy), the geopolitical benefits of being a destination for refugees are clearly all positive. No refugee is picking Russia over the U.S., for example. Unfortunately, Trump has crippled that rhetorical win.

Finally on illegal immigration, I think it’s undeniable that Trump is harder on illegal immigration than Biden would be. However, I must stress that concerns about illegal immigration are often overblown by conservatives. Although caution is warranted, it’s likely that illegal immigrants are less likely to be criminals than native born Americans. Moreover, Trump has focused on things like building a border wall (which he claimed Mexico would pay for) which the OIG found did not utilize a “sound, well-documented methodology” for where the wall would actually be built. Also, many illegal immigrants cross the border at regular checkpoints and simply overstay their visa. Additionally, the administration spent lots of effort noticeably separating young children from their parents at the border rather than on improving the infrastructure in place for immigration courts, which would actually improve the rate at which the government could deport immigrants.

Trump’s policy of harsher, haphazard (and quite frankly idiotic) illegal immigration enforcement at the cost of harming legal immigration and thwarting the American economy’s ability to integrate foreign skilled labor is simply not worth the trade off.

Housing Policy

Deregulating housing policy, especially in “blue” cities like New York and San Francisco is a key measure needed to help grow the American economy. Housing is one of the largest expenses most Americans have, yet it wasn’t always the case. Restrictive zoning has made housing exceedingly unaffordable, and conservatives ought to defend the right of property owners to do what they want on their own property. Trump actually supported deregulation ideas early on in his presidency, and then this year abruptly switched tactics to favor stronger regulation. This is anti-free market and anti economic growth. These large cities have made it harder to build new housing, which causes housing costs to rise, homelessness to increase, and the young and poor to be priced out of good opportunities. Mobility is down across the country, companies are struggling to attract employees to these high cost areas, and many are leaving. Trump is supporting this.

Network effects mean more concentrated, dense cities are much better. For example, recreating the networks that made Silicon Valley in other places is quite difficult, but as regulations make it harder to live in the Bay Area, we are forced to rebuild the aspects of the Bay Area in other places, which wastes time and energy. The same applies to every expensive U.S. city, including Boston, DC, LA, and Miami. The costs involved are astronomical, amounting to tens of trillions of dollars in lost economic productivity over years.

Biden’s housing policy is actually remarkably thoughtful and deregulatory. He proposes improving the already existing federal rental housing assistance for low income families so that all who qualify can obtain it (right now it gives out money to families until a set amount is given out instead of to all who qualify). Then he pairs that with requirements on federal housing money where municipalities must reduce zoning rules that block new housing. Obviously it’s difficult to know to what extent these policies will be exactly implemented, but if a policy even close to what Biden has proposed were to be passed, it would be a solid boon to economic growth. Moreover, it stands a good chance as it’s moderate and compromising where Trump’s housing policy.…isn’t.

Additional Issues

These issues are either where the candidates differ little, or conservatives don’t often prioritize so I’ve kept them short. Nonetheless, Biden retains an edge on these issues.

Climate Change

Many conservatives are skeptical of climate change. I found a view articulated by Russ Roberts, host of EconTalk, to be illuminating. Like nuclear war or pandemics, climate change is a risk with unknown probability. Rather than binary choice of preparing for it or not, our climate policy should weight the various catastrophic effects with the probabilities. Even if conservatives find the most dire climate predictions unlikely, some action is likely warranted under standard economic theory; negative externalities like pollution ought to be taxed. And as we’ve seen this year, it’s bad policy to shirk preparations until the catastrophe is already upon you.

Carbon taxes with offsetting tax cuts seem pretty straightforward. The Paris Climate agreement also seemed like an easy win, with countries setting their own targets. Trump’s withdrawal from this agreement seems to involve no policy calculation whatsoever since the agreement wasn’t binding anyway.

Biden’s plan is a bit aggressive for my take. It goes beyond taxing externalities and into specific government spending. Of course, Donald Trump has spent boatloads of money and would likely continue that trend. Biden spending money on green energy doesn’t seem any worse than Trump spending money on…everything. Donald Trump’s plan to do nothing about climate change seems more negative.

Fed Independence

This hasn’t turned out to be much of an issue as the Fed has been extremely active this year and we have yet to see inflation rise. Nonetheless, Donald Trump’s continued insistence that the Fed cut interest rates even as the economy was well below 5% unemployment was clearly political rather than based on any actual economic theory. This should be condemned as bad policy. Central banking should remain independent and not subject to the whims of populist rulers unless you want to be Venezuela.

Trade

Trade can have large positive impacts on the world, although trade barriers had been pretty low. The highest impact policies would be to use trade to improve relations with liberal countries and tie economic success of the U.S. to a broad liberal coalition to counter China. This is what the TPP and TTIP were, both abandoned by Trump. This is bad, free market conservatives should oppose Trump here, but Biden is not particularly free trade either.

Criminal Justice and the War on Drugs

I listed this as a large and important issue in May. However, the extent to which Trump and Biden differ on drug legalization is small. Both have expressed some interest in decriminalizing marijuana. I’m slightly more inclined to believe Biden as he has stayed with the median of the democratic party, which has largely embraced the issue, meanwhile Trump has been president for four years and done little. In overall criminal justice, democrats have as slight edge. Biden has expressed moderate views in the face of radical segments of his party, calling for reform, but also opposing calls to defund the police. Trump’s rhetoric has been rather aggressively anti-reform, but his actual policy actions seem to be small.

Counterpoints

Taxes

Joe Biden wants higher taxes than Trump. I’m against this. But I remain more positive on Biden than on Trump because of the relative weight of issue impacts. Joe Biden is not suggesting a systemic reinvention of taxation where billionaires are banned, but rather a higher level of taxation than before. I don’t know the exact details, but I would guess this would cost the American economy hundreds of billions, possibly a trillion dollars over four years. That’s pretty bad, but in a moment I’ll do a cost-benefit analysis and see how it compares.

Healthcare

I think conservatives have a strong case that Trump is better than Biden on healthcare policy, given conservative policy preferences. However, the differences are small. Trump had the opportunity to overhaul the healthcare system with a united Republican government in 2017. He provided no leadership and accomplished nothing except the repeal of the individual mandate on people who did not purchase insurance; that’s fine, but the problems in American healthcare are systemic and remain.

Joe Biden would not institute the aggressive Medicare-for-all plans of Bernie Sanders, but instead wants to create a public option. This is not a free market approach, but could actually be a good starting point to disentangle healthcare from employment. A Republican compromise that added a public option for people to buy while also reducing the mandates on what coverage employers have to provide to employees could get more people covered while also reducing reliance on employment for healthcare (which never made any sense anyway and distorts the labor market). Nonetheless, Trump could obviously try and make headway on such a system without the public option and without Biden as president, but he hasn’t. He’s mostly ignored this issue for several years.

Overall, for conservatives, I think the options are either doing nothing with a currently broken system, or see slightly worse reforms that tend to go in the wrong direction, but won’t be the end of the world. Compared to the vast differences in foreign policy, COVID-19 management, immigration, and housing policy, this just doesn’t make a dent on the enormous lead Biden has on Trump.

Justices

This is likely Trump’s biggest strength compared to Biden, however, there are some mitigating circumstances. The major one is that there are no conservative justices poised to retire soon. Clarence Thomas is 72, but many justices retire after 80. Another is that Supreme Court justices aren’t nearly as partisan as other members of the government. Many cases are decided unanimously, and many justices commonly rule against their “party” to uphold precedent. When justices do split, it’s not always clear what the lines will be. Gorsuch and Sotomayor are both strong proponents of 4th Amendment protections despite being appointed by different parties. Anthony Kennedy, despite being appointed by Reagan, was part of the majority in Kelo v New London. This ruled that state governments could seize private property and give it to private developers, which, and I can’t emphasize this enough, was outrageous. 45 states eventually passed legislation banning Kelo-like eminent domain seizures.

Which brings up another point: Congress can make laws. Remember all the debate about the Supreme Court ruling whether the President could implement his immigration bans in 2017? None of that would have mattered if Congress had simply clarified the law, and Republicans held both chambers! The level of intensity we have dedicated to Supreme Court appointments is encouraged by Congress’ inaction. We can either respond by pushing harder on court appointments, or we can respond by focusing on Congress!

Finally, judicial issues that often animate the Right aren’t always as clearly dependent on judicial makeup as we think. The rate of abortions per woman or per live birth has been steadily dropping since the early 1980s regardless of court makeup, presidential party, or Congress.

Yes, appointing good justices matters, and Neil Gorsuch is an excellent justice! But we overemphasize the importance in Supreme Court nominations, and compared to the other issues that are costing thousands of American lives, this issue isn’t enough for Trump.

The Big Picture

When it comes down to it, Biden’s tax policy is not what I want, but it’s not going to have a lasting impact on the economy. Future Republican presidents can come in and fix marginal tax rates. Trump’s housing policy will cause long term harm relative to Biden’s. The reduction in cost of living for Americans if we can properly regulate construction of new homes in cities far outweighs any tax cut and brings in network effects on American cities. Cities are the currency of the economy. To see how behind we are, look at Tokyo where in 2018 more housing units were added than in New York, Boston, Houston, and Los Angeles combined. Trump wants that trend to continue, Biden doesn’t.

Add in Trump’s growth-crushing legal immigration policy, and the choice is even more stark.

Healthcare is another area where I don’t endorse Biden’s policy. But as stated, Trump has essentially nothing to offer here despite being president for four years. From a conservative perspective, at worst, Biden could implement a public option. Note however, this leaves private insurance completely intact. There is simply not a systemic risk conservatives should worry about. U.S. healthcare already has tons of government interventions and increasing government spending in healthcare 20% isn’t good, but it’s not going to be the end of America. It will put a strain on federal government finances, but Trump has consistently demonstrated that he does not care about that issue at all.

On the other hand, Trump’s actual policy when it comes to an actual pandemic has literally resulted in 200,000 dead Americans. Again, not all of this is on Trump, but it seems plausible that his downplaying of the virus, his bungling of agency responses, and his actual rallies during the pandemic has resulted in avoidable deaths. We cannot risk another catastrophe.

Finally, there’s the question of justices. To me this seems most comparable to the long term future concerns from the Greater Power Relations section. Both issues are concerning because of their impact on the trajectory of the long term future, but one is simply much higher stakes than the other. How the U.S. manages our relationship with China determines the course of human history in this century. If we screw it up badly, millions of lives are on the line. On the other hand, if Biden is elected, he might replace Stephen Breyer with another liberal leaning justice, and as stated previously, the overall impact here is smaller than most conservatives make it out to be.

I’ve detailed the importance of how we manage geopolitics and the dangers inherent on the global stage today as they impact the long term future. Arms races are extraordinarily dangerous, and in the future humanity’s weapons will only get more powerful. Trump has not managed geopolitics well. When the COVID-19 catastrophe hit, he was again subpar and his policy was not up the task of protecting Americans. Add in his poor economic policy on housing and immigration, throw in even a fleeting concern about climate change, and the evidence against Trump’s policies in favor of Biden’s is overwhelming.

Of course, I haven’t even got to some of the most devastating critiques of Trump, since I specifically tried to avoid discussions outside of policy. However, next post, I do want to cover, if it’s even possible, all of the Trump administration’s vast corruption, gross incompetence, authoritarian acts, and his divisive and polarizing approach to politics. I think much of this “extracurricular” activity matters a great deal even though some Trump supporters may brush it aside as trolling or just politics. But even if I’m wrong, Trump’s policy record is terrible enough on its own.

A Note on the LP Candidate

I didn’t want to take too much away from the more outcome oriented discussion of the Trump and Biden, one of whom is going to win the November election. However, as I noted in my last post, many readers will not be voting in a swing state, and so may be interested in the Libertarian Party candidate Jo Jorgensen.

Her policies do reasonably well on my list of issues (not very surprising on a blog about libertarianism and politics), and since non-swing state voters have essentially no chance to impact the election, libertarian leaning voters could cast their ballot for someone they actually like without worrying about electing the worse major party candidate. Very briefly, she hasn’t impressed on the issues of great power relations and catastrophic risks, two important issues. These tend not be libertarian strengths, so that makes sense, although I maintain they are key to the long term future of the world and the U.S.

On executive power, immigration, trade, criminal justice, and taxes, Jorgensen is reiterating the standard LP positions, which are generally pretty good as far as this libertarian leaning blog is concerned. I am surprised by her lack of discussion of housing deregulation (at least I couldn’t find anything) given it’s such a key issue, as standard libertarian positions should be positive here. On healthcare, I would take more incremental steps than she would. Overall, if you’re libertarian leaning and you don’t live in a swing state, I think voting for Jorgensen or Biden are defensible positions. If you want to learn more about Jorgensen’s positions, check out her ISideWith page and website.

Picture credit: Boeing 787-10 rollout with President Trump by Ryan Johnson licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0.

Should You Vote? And How?

This post is a discussion of the U.S. voting system and the implications for strategic voting. The general conclusions are:

  • You should vote if the election is competitive
  • You should spend time researching candidates in competitive elections
  • In competitive elections, identified differences in policies between major party candidates makes it worth voting for a major party and not a third party
  • This includes smaller elections, but may not include voting for president as many states are uncompetitive

Soon I will be discussing in depth specific presidential candidates, but this post does not contain any endorsements and instead contains all the other information you might want to consider before actually researching and ranking candidates.

There’s a lot of extensive calculations doing the cost-benefit analysis, so it may be more interesting to skip around to the sections you find most interesting.

Why Do We Vote?

Harder and Krosnick (2008) suggest a variety of reasons people vote, some of which take into account cost-benefit analysis elements like the ease of registering to vote, strong differences in preferences of candidates, and the closeness of elections. They also identify many other qualities associated with voting which seem to be unrelated to the actual election, like voter demographics (education level, age, race, marital status), feelings of duty, and civic organization membership.

Generally speaking, I think most people vote by trying to select the “best” candidate through their personal lens, and they often ignore strategic voting. In contrast, I would like to cautiously advocate thinking about voting more in terms of a cost-benefit or “rational” approach.

I think voting analysis should be done in a more rigorous, forward-looking way because this approach forces a much deeper interaction with the democratic system (and the problems inherent with it). If we keep our interaction with the system relatively shallow and devoid of analysis, we can’t fix major problems that govern the voting rules themselves. It can also lead to tribalism and groupthink when actual solutions require significant problem solving and nuance.

I was inspired to think about this recently when a friend asked who I planned to cast my presidential vote for, especially since I’ve talked about third parties in the past. I responded that I hadn’t thought much about who I’d personally vote for, since I live in an extremely uncompetitive state. She surprisingly disregarded this point, and asked more pointedly who I was going to vote for. The implication seemed to largely be tribal signalling; what mattered is that we’re all on the right side, not whether our actions are actually effective.

I think this way of viewing the political system is relatively common and generally bad. Everyone has nuanced views shaped by their perspective, experience, background, etc. We should strive to create a political system with robust voting (like approval voting or score voting!) that is able to capture lots of information from voters, instead of what it currently does which is allow many ballots to be purely signalling.

However, in this blog post, I’ll be taking our troubled electoral system as is, and assume that I am unlikely to change it today, or to convince many other people to change their thinking about the electoral system. Given what we know about how ballots will be cast, what should I (and my relatively small base of readers) do to strategically maximize the payoffs in this nationwide election?

Should you vote at all?

I detailed a lot of issues with the American electoral system in the last post: uncompetitive elections, bad voting systems, gerrymandering, etc. Given all of that, whether to vote at all is an important question! Voting requires time and effort, time that could be spent in other ways that improve the world. Many libertarians don’t vote, pointing out that the chances of your vote deciding an election are minuscule. But this excellent paper (Edlin, Gelman, Kaplan 2007) makes a rigorous case for why they should.

The “waste of time” argument can be compared to arguments against playing the lottery. Yes, the payoffs if you were to cast the deciding vote in a tied election are huge, just like winning the lottery could be life-changing. Yet, you are unlikely to win the lottery. Edlin et al take this argument head on, modeling it using this equation:

Net Utility = pB - c

  • Utility is the term we’re using to describe whether voting is worth it
  • p is the probability of changing the election outcome
  • B is the benefit from voting
  • c is the cost of voting

Basically, if the benefit of deciding the election (i.e. winning the lottery) times the chance of changing the election (the election is tied until you vote) is higher than the cost of voting, we should vote. Unfortunately, p is absurdly small. It’s proportional to the total number of voters, and it’s not uncommon for many of our elections to include hundreds of thousands, if not millions of voters. There’s also the issue that many elections are uncompetitive. Thus this modified equation from the paper:

Net Utility = \frac{K}{n}B - c

  • n is the total number of voters
  • K is based on the closeness of the election (it’s the inverse of the expected percentage margin of victory). It reflects what fraction of the vote is actually “swing voters”.

More on K, for most competitive elections where we expect our candidate to get between 45-55% of the vote, K would be about 10. It is inverse to how close we expect the spread to be, so if polling indicates the candidates are within the margin of error (the closest possible election we could measure), we expect K to peak at around 25 (indicating a 4% margin of error). As elections become more of a blowout, K trends towards 1. But even if the election is close, and you estimate thousands of dollars difference in payoff between the candidates, the number of voters, n is a major problem as it quickly erases any chance of you actually affecting the outcome. Note if you add in the benefits of your family or future children, it’s not going to help much as this number is fixed and small, while the total number of voters is often in the millions.

Ok, so now the good news: the paper points out that the vast majority of voters care about what happens to the country, not just themselves. It is true that for voters completely uninterested in everyone else’s well-being, there is no reason to vote in most cases. But if you take into account the wider social benefits, then voting is often beneficial:

Net Utility = \frac{KN}{n}\alpha b - c

Here, we’ve exchanged capital B for Nɑb, where:

  • B was the total benefit
  • b is the benefit per person
  • ɑ is the amount you discount others’ benefits compared to your own
  • N is the total population of the jurisdiction of the election

N is usually a lot larger than the actual number of voters n, but the ratio of N/n depends on the jurisdiction versus the voters. For a gubernatorial election, it’s probably ~2.5, but for a congressional election, N is the whole country, while n is only your state or district. This is looking pretty good now.

There’s not much guidance of ɑ since it’s really up to the person, although the paper uses an example of ɑ = 0.1. How valuable is it to you that random strangers are $100 better off? Most people give some to charity and so clearly ɑ is something, but intuitively it doesn’t seem to be 1 since that would imply you’re indifferent between keeping all your money and giving it to a stranger. Sometimes there are “matching” charity drives, but those don’t necessarily seem more successful than regular charity, so that might imply ɑ < 0.5. The the rest of this post, we’ll use 0.1 and K=10, since those seem like reasonable assumptions and so that these terms will cancel out. Feel free to recalculate with your own values.

The Close Elections Assumption

Close elections are doing a lot of heavy lifting in this model. For the remainder of the post, I’ll be assuming that the election being discussed is close, but I should note, this actually isn’t that common. Most incumbents are handily reelected, and 34 states are at 90% or higher to vote for one presidential candidate or another a couple months before the election. There are a variety of ways to check if an individual election is actually close, and this should always be the first step before even checking out the costs and benefits of an election. They include prediction markets like PredictIt or Betfair. We’ll discuss the electoral college more directly, including swing states, later in this post, but larger elections for senator and governor might have prediction markets which can tell you when to expect a blowout. For House races, there are some prediction markets for very competitive races, but another good resource is the Cook Political Report which categorizes House races as “solid”, “likely”, “leans”, and “tossups”.

Resources for local elections for state legislature are harder to come by. Historical data can be helpful to lookup an incumbent, but sometimes this information just isn’t available. If anyone has any good advice on how to gather information for local elections, please send it to me on Twitter or leave a comment. I would love to expand this section.

K means we still shouldn’t vote in blowout elections, N/n we will address at each election, and now we just need to calculate b and c.

Costs

This isn’t straightforward, but we can estimate the cost c based on a few variables, resulting in a range for most people from an hour to a few hours. If we take the median U.S. wage of ~$20, that’s $20-$60, although since I would hope that my readership would have really high time valuations (OTOH the length of this post clearly indicates I have too much free time), that might push this range more like $50-$150. This cost of voting includes the time and effort to register to vote, research the candidates, and fill out the ballot.

Registration time costs can vary wildly. You might already be registered as most DMVs will ask if you want to register while you’re there. But if you’ve moved since your last DMV visit, you often have to fill out a form and mail it in. Finding the forms, filling it out, mailing it, etc is going to cost some time, although if you don’t move again before the next election, you can split that cost across several election cycles. If you don’t have an ID at all because you don’t drive, your state might require an entire trip to the DMV (although voter ID laws vary). I’d estimate such a situation would likely triple the cost of just voting and research time. Next, research is essential if we are going to count the social benefits b towards reasons we should vote. Obviously, we all approach politics with our own biases and viewpoints. However, I think I can still advocate for a systematic approach, trying to find the issues that have the broadest impact on the world and then comparing the candidates on those specific issues. Voting itself doesn’t take too long especially if you can request an absentee ballot which I would have recommended even before the pandemic.

Candidate research has challenges; it can be difficult to track down candidate positions. If candidates haven’t held office before, they have no record to look up, and you’re left sifting through their vague campaign websites, tweets, or speeches. You could rely on party affiliation, but that may not map well onto issues you care about. Even if you do generally prefer generic Republicans over Democrats or vice versa, a cursory lookup of each candidate is vital, as you never know when an extremist or controversial candidate could slip by, trying to ride party affiliation to office.

National or statewide races tend to be less costly in research terms since you might already be somewhat familiar with the candidates and any differences they have, so I would expect this model to support voting in more prominent races more unambiguously. This is a change from how I thought about voting in the past.

For the rest of the post, I’m going to use $300 as the cost for voting because it seems likely to be far higher than the actual cost for most people; if we can show voting (in close elections) makes sense at this cost, we’ll have shown it for the vast majority of readers.

Net Utility = \frac{KN}{n}\alpha b - 300

Benefits

That covers the costs of voting, what about the payoffs? The bottom line is that the government in the U.S. is pretty large. With a fiscal budget of trillions of dollars, even small changes can have large payoffs. This means that for most (competitive) federal elections, it’s almost always worth it to vote. State officials depend on the state budget and impact of state laws, but they too are often worth voting in.

There is, of course, uncertainty in this model. For single executive positions like President and Governor, we can be reasonably sure of policy differences which we might be able to quantify. For example, Trump has significantly reduced legal immigration into the country, while Biden has opposed this move. Legal immigrants are quite likely to start businesses and pay taxes, and so the order of magnitude difference in benefits from this Biden policy over Trump is at least in the tens of billions of dollars. Of course, immigrants can start major companies that have huge impacts on the country, like Google, eBay, and Tesla. These second order effects start to complicate how long it takes us to research candidates and compare across many issues, and with the higher research costs, the higher the benefits have to be to justify all this work.

So we’ve got uncertainty in how well we can quantify any specific policy issue, but we also are uncertain about which policies will be important; most people didn’t know terrorism was going to be presidential issue a year after the 2000 election, nor pandemics four years after the 2016 election.

Nonetheless, the following sections explore best estimates we can make about prospective candidates and incumbents to see if voting is worth the effort, given some reasonable assumptions. Moreover, with the cost of voting we calculated of $300, we only have to believe there is a difference in payoff between candidates of a few hundred dollars per capita for voting to be clearly worth it. These sections are pretty dense showing the work, so feel free to read as much or as little as seems interesting before moving on to the section about uncompetitive elections.

Governor

We can reach the $300 threshold most simply for gubernatorial elections. As stated earlier, to calculate the benefits side of the equation we can cancel out K and ɑ, leaving us N*b/n. Gubernatorial elections are simpler because N is the population of the state and n is the number of voters of a state (in e.g. Senate elections N is the whole county while n depends on each state so the ratio varies widely). The ratio of population to voters is between two and three for governor races, so I’m calling it 2.5. With c=$300, dividing that by 2.5 yields b>$120 for Net Utility to be positive. Meaning we only have to see a difference of $120 in expected per capita benefit between gubernatorial candidates for it to make sense to vote (and probably that’s too high).

Net Utility = 2.5b - 300
0 < 2.5b - 300
300 < 2.5b
120 < b

Can we do that? Here is a list of U.S. states with their accompanying budgets, including per capita budgets. $120 per capita is lower than 6% of the budget of all states. I suspect different governors can result in 6% of the budget going to different places. Additionally, state governments also pass plenty of non-fiscal legislation which won’t show up on our budgetary calculations, but is likely a major part of whatever gubernatorial candidates run on. I’d argue that reaching a $120 per person difference in expected outcomes between two candidates is pretty doable if the election is competitive.

Finally, note that similar logic applies to all state officials that run in statewide races.

House

For legislative elections, uncertainty becomes much worse, as there is additional complications introduced when legislators are part of a much larger body.

If we take the cost of voting as conservatively high at $300, then we just need the benefits of voting to be higher than that, even if figuring out the actual benefits is hard. Again this is down to Nb/n. N here is the whole country, so it’s easier to combine it with b to create the full benefit for the whole country of one House candidate winning over the other. That’s what we’re trying to find out. n is the number of voters in a House district. It varies, but is usually between 200,000 and 400,000. Worst case scenario is 400,000. In this worst case then, Nb, the total benefit of a candidate winning has to be greater than $120 million.

Net Utility = \frac{1}{400,000}Nb - 300
0 < \frac{1}{400,000}Nb - 300
300 < \frac{1}{400,000}Nb
120,000,000 < Nb

Can we convince ourselves that a House seat is worth more than that? I think we can do a clever lower bound estimate on how valuable a House seat is by looking at single-margin House votes over a two year period since that’s the length of a term.

Thinking through this problem: half the time a close vote goes the way you want, and half the time it doesn’t. Additionally, ties count as failures to pass, so changing a two-vote bill passage to a tie counts as a flip, but a two-vote defeated bill that turns into a tie is still defeated. You can take a look at my data and script here, but it’s not an exact science. I’m not checking whether these votes are actual final passage, discussions of House rules, rules of debate, or even if it’s actually a 3/5 vote that just happens to fail with a tie. In fact, the data source I’m using called voteview seems to have some inaccurate data compared to the House website, so any conclusions we take should be ballpark estimates. Nonetheless, since 1991, I find we would only expect a flipped House seat to change a couple votes a year. In a two year term, we’ll call it one to four votes. Maybe there are a few more that are simply not seen in this data set, but I would be surprised if there were more than say…10 per term.

So what does this mean? The sheer size of the federal budget means even small changes can have large payoffs; even a hundredth of a percent of the federal budget would be hundreds of millions of dollars. Individual legislators can submit amendments to fiscal bills which could change a hundredth of a percent of the budget. But since the amendments process is strongly controlled by House leadership, it’s hard to say how much power there really is at the individual legislator level. There are also non-fiscal bills whose fate is much more in the balance; a single failed vote could mean they never pass at all (examples might include Obamacare or free trade agreements).

Essentially, this is a fat-tailed scenario (the average is dominated by outliers). Most of the time, I’d guess your representative doesn’t cast deciding votes, and those deciding votes aren’t on interesting things. But every once in a while, they likely stick in an amendment or pass a bill that has a massively outsized impact that far exceeds the $120 million threshold. Still, I should admit that this is tricky .

Obviously, if the House majority were in the balance, that would pretty quickly explode the benefits of a House election, as your vote for your representative would contribute to your preferred party holding the House, assuming you prefer one party over the other. For full calculations, check Footnote 1, but it would significantly outweigh the costs discussed if the House were in the balance (this year it appears it is not).

There’s a lot of uncertainty. Quantification of policies is hazy at best, and it’s also very difficult to predict individual candidate’s actual votes or which votes will actually happen. I think future research in this area should explore situations where important issues are entirely ignored by candidates (or by Congress), as reasoning here is hard. Nonetheless, important policy differences likely exist and so it makes sense to undertake the cost of researching candidates in close House elections.

Related: I would really appreciate a website that lists every close vote so voters can look up their representative and see (A) if these votes were important and (B) whether they agree with the way in which their representative voted.

I am least confident in this section’s calculations, but assuming risk aversion of outlier scenarios (or the House being in the balance), I think we’ve gathered enough evidence that the better candidate winning would result in more than $120 million dollar difference.

Senate

Similar “close votes” logic can be applied to the Senate, although it’s complicated with the Vice President who can break ties. You can see some of the methodology discussion in Footnote 2.

Again, the methodology is rough, and I haven’t been able to count cloture votes which are often important, as well the fact that we are overcounting actual close votes, since some of these are listed as 51-49 when in reality they were cloture votes which needed 60 ayes and they weren’t close at all. I count something like ~6 votes flipped per year if you flip a Senate seat. At 6 year terms, that’s ~36 votes flipped per election, but again, this is an overestimate of close votes, but an underestimate of cloture votes. At best this gives us an order of magnitude estimate. There is another source of uncertainty when senators vote against their party, which I found slightly more common in the Senate than the House, so keep that in mind as well (538 has some data on that here).

Looking up close votes, it’s clear they vary a lot in importance. The latest roll call vote I could actually find that was a single vote victory (roll call 51) was an amendment adding boilerplate language to the joint resolution to prevent the US from attacking Iran without congressional authorization. Flipping this vote seems like it’d have no impact on anyone’s life. Roll call 30 is much more interesting. In it, 47 democrats, Susan Collins, and Mitt Romney voted to subpoena John Bolton for the senate trial of the president. The vote failed as 51 Republicans voted against it. Here, clearly an additional democratic vote would have been large in revealing whatever John Bolton would have said, although likely would have remained far short of the 67 votes needed to remove him from office.

Generally speaking, I think we can say there are more close votes in the Senate due to being a smaller chamber and having six year terms instead of two. Additionally the Senate also has more responsibility in major appointments. I estimate 4-10x as many close votes and more important votes. However, the number of voters in a Senate race varies massively since districts are not population adjusted like in the House. For example, the 2018 California Senate election had 11 million votes, while the Wyoming Senate election had only 200,000, basically equivalent to a House district. Of course, we should note that the Wyoming Senate election wasn’t close and the California senate seat wasn’t that close either, and even then it was between two Democrats so the difference in payoff was likely smaller than between a Republican and Democrat. Here’s a worst case scenario for Senate benefits in California. Again, were looking for Nb as that’s the benefit to the entire country of a Senate seat flipping:

Net Utility = \frac{1}{11,000,000}Nb - 300
0 < \frac{1}{11,000,000}Nb - 300
300 < \frac{1}{11,000,000}Nb
3,300,000,000 < Nb

That’s $3.3 billion. Can we find that in close Senate votes over six years? I think so. Unlike highly variable and rare House votes, we can usually guarantee at least one close vote will happen on an important topic. $3.3billion is less than a percent of non-military discretionary spending, so this seems plausible.

Our conclusions are similar to the House elections. In close elections, it makes a lot of sense to vote even though there is going to be a lot of uncertainty in what votes elected officials will actually face and even what their position could be. Voters in smaller states with close Senate elections have the largest expected payoffs. If you’re uncertain about which candidate is better because of previously mentioned issues with candidates ignoring your primary issues or split among important ones, close Senate elections in small states are probably worth the time to sit down and try and do some estimations of each candidate and policy payoffs.

The Electoral College

I wrote about the implications of the electoral college for third parties in 2016. This year’s post on strategic voting is an elaboration on that model, so even though I’ve taken a slightly different editorial position, the implications for president are similar. It all comes down to the K variable we’ve been using. I’ve had to preface every recommendation with the fact that the election must be close, because even Edlin at al don’t say there’s a positive payoff to vote if the election is already decided.

This most often asserts itself in the presidential election with the electoral college. The way to think about this idea is the “Tipping Point Jurisdiction”. If we listed every state in order by (Trump percentage) – (Biden percentage), and then added up the number of electoral votes, the state that puts either one above 270 is the tipping point. In 2016, this was Wisconsin. Even though Michigan was closer in percentage points, Clinton would have needed to win Michigan, Pennsylvania, and then Wisconsin to get 270 electoral votes. In 2000, this was famously Florida. Your vote for president is only decisive if cast in the Tipping Point Jurisdiction.

Here is a prediction market for chances of any state becoming the Tipping Point state. Because of PredictIt’s fee structure, these probabilities are slightly inflated, and I wouldn’t trust much in a market below 5% to reflect what bettors actually thought. Additionally, it’s still relatively early in the election cycle, so we’d expect more certainty as we get closer to election day.

StatePredict It %538 %
PA2323
FL2224
WI1410.4
MN88.9
MI86.4
AZ75.3
NC63.7
NV42.8
OH32.7
Total: 9587.2

This isn’t meant to be a projection, but just a snapshot that we can use. Even today, two months before the election we’re 90% sure that one of these states will be the tipping point state. The payoff equation for these swing states is pretty clear:

Net Utility = \frac{Nb}{n}p_tp_m - c
  • Nb is again going to be the full benefit to the country (actually, I guess the world?) if one candidate is president compared to another.
  • n is the number of voters in your swing state
  • pt is going to be the chance your state is the tipping point jurisdiction, which is what table above shows
  • pm is the probability that the margin of the electoral college ends up being less than the electoral votes in your state.

These ideas are taken from this paper by Gelman, Silver, and Edlin. To get a rough estimate, we can use this prediction market, which suggests for most states pm is probably only 10-20%, although that could change as we get closer to election. We probably need a full table of probabilities, but here’s Florida’s calculations:

Net Utility = \frac{Nb}{9,500,000}0.22*0.17 - 300
0 < \frac{Nb}{9,500,000}0.22*0.17 - 300
300 < \frac{Nb}{9,500,000}0.0374
2,850,000,000 < 0.0374Nb
76,203,000,000 < Nb

So if there’s a difference in the world of Biden being president over Trump of $76 billion, it’d be worth it to vote in Florida, although it’d be good to redo the calculations with updated numbers closer to election day. Can we get to that number by comparing Biden and Trump? I think so, but you’ll have to wait until my next blog post for the full discussion.

Additional Offices

I don’t have much to add here because advice becomes exceedingly hard to give. The math suggests that state legislator elections will actually scale marginally well since you have a much smaller pool of voters and thus your vote is worth more, precisely outweighing the loss of stakes when switching from federal to state elections. You can try to do the same trick I did earlier with small vote margins in state legislatures, and I’d be curious what you find. Many states are dominated by one party and so I can imagine fewer close votes, but I don’t know. However, as mentioned earlier, the costs to obtain good information might be much harder. Single office elections like Mayor seem much more likely to be easier to calculate benefits and compare candidates.

But What If It’s Not Close?

The short answer is: don’t worry about uncompetitive elections.

The longer answer is: there might be a couple marginal reasons to vote. For example, in presidential elections, ballot access for third parties often depends on small thresholds for third party votes, like 2% or 5%. These might be achievable if you prefer third parties and live in a non-swing state. This is likely what I will personally do, as I live in an uncompetitive state, and tend to favor libertarian candidates.

Also, a quick note on personal enjoyment; some people really like voting. I’ve eschewed psychological reasoning in the rest of this post, but we can’t ignore that a sense of duty or tribal fervor could also be a benefit you get that outweighs the cost of waiting in line or filling out registration forms. The reason I only include those benefits in this section is that unlike benefits from policy, these psychological benefits do not accrue to your fellow citizens. In close elections what should motivate our actions is what would actually improve the world.

When it comes to Donald Trump, there have been predictions and accusation by Obama and Trump of election engineering that could occur during this election. This is concerning. If you strongly support or oppose Donald Trump, it may be worth it to vote even in uncompetitive states to push the popular vote total in your direction in the hopes of making the vote such a rout that a constitutional crisis is impossible. I’m unsure to what extent this will matter in the case of a contested election compared to election results in swing states, but The Economist thinks a decisive popular vote could assure an uneventful transition of power. In swing states, I recommend voting for a major party anyway.

Third Parties in Close Elections

In perhaps a disappointment for my libertarian skewing readership, it only makes sense to vote for third parties in elections that aren’t close. For good or bad, there are tons of uncompetitive elections, and I think third parties, and the Libertarian Party in particular should continue to target those elections. In gerrymandered districts where single party rule dominates, they have a chance to become a real “second party”. The payoff of who is in government is actually really high, and so on expectation, it makes sense to choose a specific major party candidates when both have a chance to win.

That doesn’t mean you can’t advocate for voting reform (reminder that approval voting is on the ballot in St. Louis this year!), or call your senator, or donate money to libertarian causes, it just means that some elections matter and you can have real impact by deciding the winner.

Footnotes

Footnote 1: House majority calculations. If you see strong differences between Nancy Pelosi and Kevin McCarthy deciding which legislation is brought to the floor, that could potentially be worth tens of billions of dollars, maybe even $100 billion. I’m doubtful it would be worth much more than that though, as this is only one chamber of one branch of government. And of course, if you’re a libertarian who disagrees with much of what both Nancy Pelosi and Kevin McCarthy believe, then such differences in majority control are smaller. The analysis here would be like a second order election on top of your vote for local congressman. Assuming House majority control is in the balance in the election (this year, it doesn’t appear to be), you’d need to add another term to our equations to account for smaller probability of your representative casting the deciding vote for Speaker. We’d thus multiply by an additional K/n where K=10 and n=435 for all House members.

Net Utility = \frac{KN}{n}\alpha b\frac{K_H}{n_H} - c

We’ll cancel out K and α, Nb is the full benefit of a certain party being in control, n= between 200,000-400,000 for most House districts. The second fraction KH/nH = 0.023. Overall, this works out to ~$5000 ballpark estimate for a $50B difference in majority control. Obviously, this would make it worth it to vote in House elections, although again, that’s not likely to be on the table in this election.

Footnote 2: Senate calculations. The Vice president acts like an extra Senator. So if the VP is someone you agree with, you can take that into account (or vice versa). But if there’s uncertainty (for example, we don’t know who will be Vice President in 2021), you can estimate that half the time the VP votes in your interests. The other half of the time your “side”, however you define that, loses the vote. An extra senator would flip those votes because the tie would be broken before the VP votes (i.e. the VP could break a tie against your side if it’s 50-50, but doesn’t get a chance to if the vote is 51-49). I downloaded Senate vote data here and looked at votes from 1991 on. You can find my code and data here.

Picture credit: League of Women Voters of California, licensed under CC-BY-2.0